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Abstract
The potentially catastrophic impact of a bioterrorist attack
makes developing effective detection methods essential for
public health. In the case of anthrax attack, a delay of hours
in making a right decision can lead to hundreds of lives lost.
Current detection methods trade off reliability of alarms for
early detection of outbreaks. The performance of these meth-
ods can be improved by modern disease-speciﬁc modeling
techniques which take into account the potential costs and ef-
fects of an attack to provide optimal warnings. We study this
optimization problem in the reinforcement learning frame-
work. The key contribution of this paper is to apply Partially
Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) on out-
break detection mechanism for improving alarm function in
anthrax outbreak detection. Our approach relies on estimat-
ing the future beneﬁt of true alarms and the costs of false
alarms and using these quantities to identify an optimal deci-
sion. We present empirical evidence illustrating that the per-
formance of detection methods with respect to sensitivity and
timeliness is improved signiﬁcantly by utilizing POMDPs.
Introduction
High-risk decision problems under uncertainty have consid-
erable impact in many areas in public health. However, there
has been relatively little work in this area. The very real
threat of bioterrorism has accelerated the critical need for
timely detection of outbreaks. As a result, the need for pre-
cise modeling and analysis of decisions faced by surveil-
lance systems for providing the optimal warnings is becom-
ing more acute. In the particular case of anthrax attack, de-
lays of hours in making a decision to intervene can lead to
hundredsofliveslost(Kaufmann, Meltzer, &Schmid. 1997;
Wagner et al. 2001) and millions of dollars of additional ex-
penses. Currentstudiesofsurveillancesystemshavedemon-
strated that a good detection algorithm can discover a dis-
ease outbreak before individual cases are diagnosed clini-
cally. However, making a decision as to whether the partial
information from a surveillance system reﬂects a real out-
break, is a challenge. Detection methods often can be ad-
justed to increase or decrease the sensitivity of their detec-
tion. These methods generally use a threshold which can be
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tuned to increase sensitivity. However, improvement in sen-
sitivity usually occurs at the cost of lower speciﬁcity. Intu-
itively, the optimal level of sensitivity relative to speciﬁcity
depends on a speciﬁc disease. Although surveillance sys-
tems with low speciﬁcity generate many false alarms, which
mayultimatelybeignoredbypublichealthpersonnel. Atthe
speciﬁcity of 0.9, (Buckeridge et al. 2006) show syndromic
surveillance detected anthrax outbreaks on average one day
before clinical case ﬁnding conﬁrmed the outbreaks. This
speciﬁcity is considered relatively low since it corresponds
to 1 false alarm every 10 days.
The uncertainty as to whether an unusual pattern in the
surveillance data is caused by anthrax makes it difﬁcult to
decide on whether to signal an alarm. The low speciﬁcity
of detection methods makes it difﬁcult to decide how credi-
ble are the resulting alarm signals. The sequential nature of
the problem, the time-criticality of response decision mak-
ing under these uncertain conditions, and the high risk of de-
lays suggest strongly the need for a formal decision model
to guide public health responses to the results of detec-
tion methods. Examples of decisions raised in response to
anomalies in surveillance data include: whether or not we
should wait to collect more data; whether we should inves-
tigate more information resources; or we should conﬁrm an
outbreak when we receive an alarm.
In this paper, we address precise modeling and analysis of
decisions faced by surveillance systems for providing opti-
mal warning of an epidemic. As a speciﬁc example we con-
sider anthrax outbreaks. Our approach to tackle this problem
is motivated by a principal observation that quantifying the
potentialcostsandeffectsofanattackandthecostandeffec-
tiveness of interventions can be used as important criteria for
optimizing the alarm function. We formulate the decision
making problem for anthrax outbreak detection in POMDPs
(Kaelbling, Littman, & Cassandra. 1998). In decision theo-
reticplanning, POMDPsarewellknownasthemostrealistic
model for decision making under uncertainty in dynamical
systems. They have been widely proposed in modeling de-
cision making in various domains such as medical decision
making, mining engineering, robotics, and many more (Cas-
sandra 1998b). Our POMDP model of a surveillance system
accounts for the normal situation and different states of the
attack after anthrax release until the time that an attack can
be detected through clinical diagnosis of affected individ-
1781uals. The result of a detection method is used to provide
observations to the POMDP model as noisy sensation about
these true but unobservable states. The POMDP model per-
forms further analysis on these results and optimizes the
appropriate strategy to take in response to the output from
the detection method. The enhanced detection approach de-
scribed here can be coupled with any traditional outbreak
detection method to optimize the way that the surveillance
systems process alarm function.
Partially Observable Markov Decision
Processes
In this section we review the POMDP framework and illus-
trate solving sequential decision problems in POMDPs. For-
mally, a POMDP is deﬁned by the following components: a
ﬁnite set of hidden states S, a ﬁnite set of actions A, a ﬁnite
set of observations Z, a transition function T : S×A×S →
[0,1], such that T(s,a,s ) is the probability that the agent
will end up in state s  after taking action a while in state
s, an observation function O : A×S×Z → [0,1], such that
O(a,s ,z) gives the probability that the agent receives obser-
vation z after taking action a and reaching state s , an initial
belief state b0, which is a probability distribution over the set
of hidden states S and a reward function R : S×A×S → ℜ,
such that R(s,a,s ) is the immediate reward received when
the agent takes action a in hidden state s and ends up in state
s . Additionally, there can be a discount factor, γ ∈ (0,1),
which is used to give less weight to rewards received further
in the future.
Solving POMDPs
The goal of a POMDP agent is to ﬁnd a long term plan or
policy for acting in such a way as to maximize the total ex-
pected reward received. The best such plan is called an opti-
mal policy or an optimal solution for the POMDP. The agent
in a POMDP does not have knowledge of the hidden states,
it only perceives the world through noisy observations as de-
ﬁned by the observation function O. Hence, the agent must
keep a complete history of its actions and observations, or a
sufﬁcient statistic of this history, in order to act optimally.
The sufﬁcient statistic in a POMDP is the belief state b,
which is a vector of length |S| specifying a probability distri-
bution over hidden states. The elements of this vector, b(i),
specify the conditional probability of the decision making
agent being in state si, given the initial belief b0 and the his-
tory (sequence of actions and observations) experienced so
far. After taking action a and receiving observation z, the
POMDP agent updates its belief state b  using Bayes’ Rule:
b (s )=P(s |b,a,z)
=
O(a,s ,z)∑s∈Sb(s)T(s,a,s )
P(z|a,b)
The denominator is a normalizing constant and is given by
the sum of the numerator over all values of s  ∈ S.
A policy is a mapping π : B → A. The amount of total
expected reward that a decision maker can accumulate over
its lifetime as given by the horizon h and following a policy
π is called the value function of π. Most of the POMDP
algorithms are based on estimating a value function. A value
function Vπ of the policy π deﬁnes the value for each belief
state under policy π.
Vπ :B → ℜ (1)
The value function assigns to each belief state b the expected
valueof the total rewardthe agent canget in the future, given
that its starting point is b. The optimal policy π∗ in particular
is the one that maximizes the total expected future reward:
π∗(b)= arg max π E[
h−1
∑
t=0
γtrt+1|b] (2)
Finding optimal policies for POMDPs is generally difﬁ-
cult. We can transform a POMDP into a belief state MDP.
Under this transformation, the belief state b becomes the
(continuous) state of the MDP (Markov Decision Process).
The problem here is that there are inﬁnite number of be-
lief states b, so solving the above equation in exact form
is very difﬁcult. For further details on POMDPs solu-
tion methods we refer interested readers to (Lovejoy 1991;
Cassandra. 1998a).
Considerable research effort has been devoted to the de-
sign of approximation algorithms for POMDPs to make
these models practical. Recently, algorithms have been
proposed which take advantage of the fact that, for most
POMDP problems, a large part of the belief space is not ex-
perienced by the agent and the actual belief states have a
sparse probability distribution. Such approaches, which are
known as point-based methods (Pineau, Gordon, & Thrun
2003), consider only a ﬁnite set of belief points and plan for
those points only. Point-based algorithms rely on the fact
that performing many fast approximate updates often results
in a more useful value function than performing a few ex-
act updates. This algorithm and its variations gained much
success in solving POMDP problems which are orders of
magnitude large or more difﬁcult than the ones solvable by
exact solution methods.
Outbreak Detection in Surveillance Systems
The objective of detection algorithms in public health
surveillance systems is to recognize from sequential input
data (e.g. medical visits, absenteeism from work, drug con-
sumption) the occurrence of an event such as an epidemic. A
detection method may be as simple as comparing the ampli-
tude of the signal with a threshold. If this value is above the
pre-speciﬁed threshold of the algorithm then the algorithm
indicates an alarm for a detected outbreak.
The accuracy of the detection method is reported using
various ratios such as sensitivity, speciﬁcity. Sensitivity is
the probability of an alarm given an outbreak, P(A|O)=
n(A,O)
n(O) . Speciﬁcity is the probability of no alarm given that
there is no outbreak, P(A−|O−)=
n(A−,O−)
n(O−) . Timeliness is
also treated as a property of a detection method. Timeli-
ness can be measured by: detection time - actual time of the
event. The timeliness of a method is usually improved by
adjustment of its threshold and at the expense of its other pa-
rameters. The outputs of an ideal surveillance system should
1782be those needed for response. However, these methods have
to usually trade-off between timeliness and sensitivity on
the one hand, versus speciﬁcity or false alarms on the other
hand. The primary challenge to interpreting the output of the
surveillance systems is the signal noise, or unpredictability,
that prevents accurate modeling of the data and leads to er-
rors in the model’s predictions. These errors appear as noise
that may cause false positives and false negatives. False pos-
itives occur when noise spikes in the model’s predictions are
detected as possible outbreaks, loweringthe system’s overall
speciﬁcity. False negatives occur when noise in the model’s
predictions masks the effects of actual outbreaks, lowering
overall sensitivity (Reis, Pagano, & Mandl 2003).
Popular methods for outbreak detection include simple
and exponential weighted moving averages, applied either
directly to the data or to residuals obtained by comparing
observed data to expected data (Thacker & Berkelman 1998;
Box & Jenkins. 1976; Reis & Mandl 2003). A fundamental
challenge of detection systems is that if we increase the sen-
sitivity of the system and improve the timeliness of detec-
tion, then the number of false alarms will increase. Unfor-
tunately, these systems have low sensitivity during the ﬁrst
few days after a release of anthrax.
Formulating the Anthrax Outbreak Problem
in POMDP Framework
The epidemic curve for anthrax by days after exposure is
assumed to be < 1 day, 0% of cases; 1 day, 5%; 2 days,
20%; 3 days, 35%; 4 days, 20%; 5 days, 10%; 6 days,
5%; and 7 or more days, 5% (Messelson et al. 1994;
Benenson AS 1995). The mean time for clinical detection
of anthrax is estimated to be between 3-4 days following a
release of 0.1 kg of anthrax spore in an urban area (Adamou
et al. 2006) and (Buckeridge et al. 2006). Therefore, if a
surveillance system takes longer than 3-4 days to detect an
outbreak, then the system may not be very helpful. There
is always a small probability of starting an outbreak. In a
normal situation (no outbreak) we assume a probability of
an attack P = 0.01. We use this prior knowledge in the tran-
sition function of the model which is discussed later in this
section. Here we build the model and its parameters based
on experts opinions, and the results from simulation stud-
ies in the literature for anthrax attacks. Figure 1 depicts the
POMDP model we designed for this problem.
Figure 1: The POMDP model for anthrax outbreak detection.
The economical impact of an attack used in our POMDP
model is based on the analysis reported in (Kaufmann,
Meltzer, & Schmid. 1997). Figure 2 shows the cumu-
lative economic impact of a large release of aerosolized
B.anthracis created from this analysis. The authors consider
the impact of an attack on a suburb of a major city, with
100,000 people exposed in the target area. This is based on
cost estimation of deaths, the costs of hospitalizations, the
costs of outpatient visits. The rewards and costs are related
to:
• Cost of a single false positive and false negative;
• Cost of intervention ( depends on the population size, cost
per person, and implementation time);
• Cost of a single day delay;
• Detection beneﬁt = the number of death × future earn-
ings + number of hospital days × cost of 1 hospital day
+ number of outpatient visits × cost of 1 outpatient visits
intervention costs;
• Intervention costs = cost per person × number of cases
seeking care
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Figure 2: The estimate of accumulative preventable loss for de-
tection of anthrax per day after a release.
Model Parameters
• The state space: we propose to consider a state space
consisting of six states: NoOutbreak, Day1, Day2,
Day3,Day4 and OutbreakDetected to reﬂect the assump-
tion that at an outbreak will be detected clinically within
5 days.
• Theactionspace: weconsider4possiblestrategiesavail-
able at each time. These are declare an outbreak as a safe
but very expensive option; a somewhat cheaper option of
more systematic studies to gather extra information from
external sources ( for example more patient ﬁles in emer-
gency departments); more investigation can take up to a
few hours of a human expert to review carefully data al-
ready in hand ; and the last option is not to do anything
and wait. The space of actions is based on standard strate-
gies in epidemiology (Gregg. 1996) and discussions with
epidemiologists.
1783• The observation space: at each instant of time (a day),
we perceive observations from a detection method which
reﬂect an alarm condition. These observations which
are dependent on the underlying state of the model are
some informative statistics output from detection algo-
rithm. The output of a detection system includes a se-
quentially updated probabilistic assessment of the threats
being monitored. The distribution of p-value, one-step-
ahead daily forecast of respiratory syndrome counts, and
cumulative sum for detection of positive deviation in the
forecast residuals are commonly available assessments in
detection algorithms. In this model, we have considered
two observations, suspicious and non-suspicious to re-
ﬂect the binary output received from a detection algo-
rithm.
• Transition functions: There is a small chance of moving
to the ﬁrst day of an attack from the NoOutbreak state un-
der any action. We consider the probability of P = 0.01
for this case. The transition through consequent days of
an outbreak by choosing to wait is performed naturally. A
systematic study may take 1 day to give some probability
of an attack and the investigation option takes only a few
hoursofa humanexpert. Humandecisionmakersare sub-
ject to biases that lead to suboptimal decisions, especially
when they are dealing with rare events, uncertainty, and
high cost options (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky. 1982).
Therefore, the systematic study and the investigation op-
tions can reduce the uncertainty about the state of the out-
break by only a small amount. This amount increases as
the the outbreak progresses. After comprehensive discus-
sions with domain experts we decide to consider an extra
10 percent sensitivity for the investigation action and an
extra 30 percent sensitivity for the systematic study. This
means that the probability of the attack being detected af-
ter an investigation on day1 will be 0.1 and after system-
atic study this would be 0.3.
• Observation functions: as the outbreak progresses the
detection method provides more reliable information on
whether or not there is an outbreak. At any outbreak state,
for deﬁned observation suspicious, the observation func-
tion is deﬁned by the sensitivity of the detection method
used. For the second observation the noise is deﬁned as
1−specificity at normal states.
• Reward-Cost functions: There is a reward/cost associ-
atedwitheachactionateachunderlingstateofthesystem.
In the NoOutbreak state, if we choose not to do anything,
we do not incur any cost. For other situations we use pre-
vious studies modeling anthrax (Braithwaite, Fridsma, &
Roberts 2006; Kaufmann, Meltzer, & Schmid. 1997) to
incorporate more realistic information to the model. We
have used the difference between preventable losses in
each day and in the consecutive day presented in Figure 2
as the reward for declaring an outbreak on each day of
the outbreak. For the investigation option we have as-
sumed that it takes almost half a day to perform this ac-
tion. Therefore, in this case we assigned half of the re-
ward for transiting to outbreak detected states from each
day of the outbreak. We also assumed that a systematic
study takes one day to perform. Therefore, we consider
the reward of the next day for transiting to outbreak de-
tected state up on taking this action. The penalty of not
detecting the outbreak and transition to the next state of
the outbreak is determined by the corresponding loss at
that state. There is a penalty equal to treatment expenses
for maximum number of people seeking care, for choos-
ing to conﬁrm an outbreak from a clear states. In com-
puting the number of people seeking care and number of
deaths. we considered a population of 100,000 exposed,
as in (Kaufmann, Meltzer, & Schmid. 1997). The au-
thors modeled the costs and beneﬁts based on clinical and
experimental ﬁndings with respect to the disease progres-
sion and treatment options.
Discussion
We argued that the alarm function in outbreak detection
methods can be formulated as a decision problem. However,
there are other aspects of disease outbreak which can also
be formulated as decision problems and can be solved by
optimization techniques. This include data gathering form a
verity of sources at different expenses: as which data are
more useful for early detection? The response strategies
and treatment options after the outbreak conﬁrmed are de-
cision making problems which requires precise modeling
and optimization. Public health researchers are motivated
to apply mathematical frameworks in signal detection the-
ory and decision theory to provide better analysis and mea-
surement in this area (Wagner et al. 2001; Wagner, Moore,
& Aryel 2006). Probabilistic graphical models have been
suggested in related work in detecting epidemics. (LeStrat
& Carrat. 1999) proposed detecting epidemic and non-
epidemic phases of inﬂuenza by HMMs using a mixture of
Gaussian distributions. (Rath, Carreras, & Sebastiani 2003)
also proposed using a 2-state HMM, where non-epidemic
rates are modeled with an exponential distribution, and epi-
demic rates with a Gaussian distribution. We note that (Das,
Moore, & Schneider. 2004) previously suggested the use
of POMDP belief states for a decision to signal an alarm in
surveillance systems. However, the authors did not explain
the design of the model components including the reward
function which motivates the progression of POMDP solu-
tion methods. A simple 2-3 state POMDP introduced by
the authors can not explain the status of a surveillance sys-
tem under different diseases. Clearly, the reward function
and the state space deﬁnitions are domain dependent factors
and have to be estimated carefully for the disease monitored
by the surveillance systems. To date, there have been few
economic analyses of biosurveillance problems (Kaufmann,
Meltzer, & Schmid. 1997; Meltzer, Cox, & Fukuda 2005;
Wagner, Wallstrom, & Onisko 2005). Achieving this level
of analysis is considered as a long-term goal for biosurveil-
lance research (Wagner, Moore, & Aryel 2006).
Empirical evaluations
To work with a detection method and guide response strate-
gies, in our experimental setup we used a moving average
method, applied to residuals from a time-series model, to
1784provide the observation for the POMDP model. The policy
obtained from solving the POMDP model is the one with
minimum amount of cost and maximum amount of pos-
sible reward. The exact solution methods were unable to
solve this POMDP. We have used a point-base approxima-
tion method introduced in (Izadi, Precup, & Azar. 2006) to
solve this POMDP in a few seconds.
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Figure 3: The timeliness of anthrax outbreak detection method
with and without using POMDPs: sensitivities during different
days of the outbreak for attacks that resulted in 10 additional visits.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 summarize our experimental re-
sults utilizing the POMDP model. The results for the mov-
ing average method were extracted from the results in (Reis,
Pagano, & Mandl 2003). We considered a ﬁxed speciﬁcity
of 0.97 for all cases. The results reported for the case of
POMDP are based on averages of 10 independent runs of
the POMDP generative model over 5000-day time period.
Over this period, we examined 257 outbreak on average.
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Figure 4: The timeliness of anthrax outbreak detection method
with and without using POMDPs: sensitivities during different
days of the outbreak for attacks that resulted in 20 additional visits.
The timeliness of different approaches with respect to the
actual days of the outbreak is shown in the ﬁgures. All out-
breaks were detected by our approach prior to the fourth day
of the attacks when the detection method provides a better
sensitivity. The other model was based on the moving av-
erage method which provides low sensitivity, can not de-
tect all the outbreaks prior to day 4. Of course not all out-
breaks are detected by the moving average methods at the
speciﬁcity equal to 0.97 in general. The POMDP utilizing
approach yielded much higher sensitivity for both outbreak
sizes, while maintaining the same speciﬁcity, resulting in
much better overall performance.
Conclusion and future work
The events surrounding an outbreak due to bioterrorism will
unfold rapidly. The response decision making must be for-
malized in advance of an attack into a decision policy that
can be applied without bias or delay during a crisis. In this
paper, we discussed the development of an optimal surveil-
lance alarm function for anthrax outbreak. The empirical
evaluation of our approach shows dramatic improvements
over traditional outbreak detection methods. Our promis-
ing results suggest further directions for research, including
consideration of outbreaks due to other diseases. Infectious
threats such as SARS and human H5N1 inﬂuenza infections
have prompted the development of detection systems that re-
spond in a timely way to emerging epidemics, allowing au-
thorities to respond at the earliest possible stage. Worldwide
developments concerning biological weapons and terrorism
are driving force for improving public health surveillance
and outbreak response. It is worth mentioning that our ap-
proach applies not only to surveillance for outbreaks caused
by terrorists, but also to naturally occurring outbreaks both
in the community and in hospitals. In future work, we in-
tend to apply our proposed model to routinely encountered
infectious diseases such as inﬂuenza. Working with more
frequent threats such as water contamination or inﬂuenza
makes this application potentially useful for routinely en-
countered public health problems.
To apply our approach to any surveillance system, the set
of actions appropriate to the disease in question must be
determined and the accuracy of effects of actions must be
quantiﬁed. It is important to have economic estimates of
the effect of different actions as a function of time for those
threats. The appropriate state space which corresponds to
the time window for the speciﬁc disease must also be iden-
tiﬁed. Timely detection is not a key requirement of every
public health threat, but it is for many. We found a rich
literature on quantitative and qualitative analysis of timeli-
ness requirements for the case of inhalational anthrax. This
type of analysis is needed to do more research and develop-
ment on reliable and early warning systems for other types
of threats.
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